Issue 4

 

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Issue  #004                                                                                          Av 5768- August 2008

 
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In This Issue
The Eternal Present
Is Your Vote For Sale
Piskei Halacha- Baal Talin III
Introducing the Archives of Ethics Daf Yomi Project


Ask!The Eternal Present
“Hi Shmuel, how are you” chimed a familiar voice on Shmuel’s cell phone. It was his good friend Doniel. I hear you are on your way to Costco. Yes, that’s right. I’ve got to stock up on some essentials. “Shmuel?'” Doniel asked, “Today is my son’s birthday. Since you’re going to there anyway, I’d like to ask you for a small favor. My son has been dreaming about the latest MP3 player that hit the market; The one made by Kingmax. I heard they have only a few left in town at Costco. Could you perhaps pick one up for me before they’re all gone? I’ll bring the money over to your wife so she can accept it for you today.” “Sure!” Shmuel replied cheerfully. “It’s my pleasure, and please . . .wish him a happy birthday from me as well”.

Sure enough when Shmuel got to Costco, there were only two pieces left. As he turned toward the checkout line he was almost bowled over by a twelve year old kid making a bee line to the audio device section. Rounding the corner of the aisle he took a glance back and noticed the boy grinning from ear to ear as he ‘chapped’ up the last Kingmax mp3 player. And with that, even Costco was out of the season’s hottest item.

On his way home Shmuel reflected on his day and enjoyed the knowledge that he had helped his friend with this favor. Suddenly, his thoughts were interrupted by a phone call from his son Meir. “Daddy, are you still in Costco?” “No sweetheart I’m on my way home. . .but I can go back. What is it that you need?” “Well” Meir began “do you remember you said you would get me a prize for receiving a 98 on my Gemarah test?” “I certainly do” Shmuel replied. Mommy and I really appreciate all the extra work you have been putting in.” “Daddy I decided I would like the new Kingmax MP3 player. I heard there were only a few left in Costco. . .and everywhere else has been sold out for weeks.”

Shmuel now faced an ethical dilemma. He hadn’t yet informed Doniel that he purchased the player. Could he tell Doniel they only had one left and he bought it for his son? Perhaps he had already acquired it for Doniel and must give it to him?

Shmuel doesn’t realize that this is more than an ethical dilemma and that he is halachicaly obligated to deliver the player to his friend.

According to Jewish law, when one purchases an item, on behalf of his friend, his friend automatically acquires it even if he was not aware that the purchase was effectuated. The Gemarah asserts on a number of occasions that “The hand of a messenger is like the hand of the dispatcher”. Therefore as soon as Shmuel made the purchase on behalf of Doniel, Talmudic Law considers the player as Doniel’s property. If Shmuel gives the player to his son, he is essentially giving his son something that doesn’t belong to him.

Furthermore, since Doniel has acquired the player, Shmuel may not even try to convince Doniel to sell it to him. The Torah states “Lo Sachmod” which literally means “Thou shalt not covet.” While normally we understand this commandment as teaching us to be happy with our lot and not to be jealous, one does not actually violate the prohibition by feeling jealousy. However, if he takes action to try and pressure the other person to sell or give him the item that he is jealous of, he transgresses the prohibition. This is true even if the seller agrees to sell the item willingly and certainly if he feels coerced through guilt or some other measure.

It would be best for Shmuel to explain these sensitivities to his son. If he can successfully imbue these morals upon his son, he has in essence given him a far greater gift than  any  electronic  device. . . and one that will not be found on the bottom of the toy closet next Erev Pesach.

hlachic headlines logo 
 


Is Your Vote for Sale

From
a recent AP story:

MINNEAPOLIS
(AP) ” A college student claimed it was all a joke when he put
his vote in this fall’s presidential election up for sale on the Web
auction site eBay. But prosecutors didn’t see the humor.

University
of Minnesota student Max P. Sanders, 19, was charged with a felony
Thursday in Hennepin County District Court after allegedly asking for
a minimum of $10 in exchange for voting for the bidder’s preferred
candidate. …

Sanders
was charged with one count of bribery, treating and soliciting under
an 1893 state law that makes it a crime to offer to buy or sell a
vote. …

The
scarcely used law had its heyday in the 1920s, when many people sold
their votes in exchange for liquor, Assistant County Attorney Pat
Diamond said. …

The
charge carries up to five years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.

What
are the Halachic issues raised by vote buying?

Chasam
Sofer has a fascinating responsum on this topic (CM 160, cited by
Pischei Teshuvah CM 8:1). A certain community (whose name he omits,
presumably for the obvious reasons) had decided to utilize a certain
voting procedure to choose from among four candidates for the
position of Rabbi of the community. Subsequent to the implementation
of the vote, rumors circulated that members of the community had
received pecuniary consideration from relatives of the winner to vote
for him, and there was even the discovery of an incriminating letter,
purporting to be from a member of the community, which made clear
reference to the scandalous arrangement. A great commotion ensued,
the community split into two factions, and Chasam Sofer attempted to
act as peacemaker and settle the matter.

Regarding
the technical Halachic question of the validity of the vote, Chasam
Sofer argues that it is absolutely certain that if the fact of the
bribery can be established through the testimony of two impartial
witnesses, then the vote is void. He infers this from a ruling of
Rema (CM 163:1):

“All
communal needs, which cannot be agreed upon [by the members of the
community], we confer with all the householders who pay tax, and they
accept upon themselves that they will all express their views for the
sake of Heaven, and they follow the majority.”

Chasam
Sofer argues that one who is paid to vote has not given his opinion
‘for the sake of Heaven’. I have long wondered, however, as to what
exactly is included in the requirement that they vote ‘for the sake
of Heaven’? E.g, if the community is considering the construction of
a wall, and I am the local stonemason, must I attempt to sequester
that fact and try to determine what I would recommend if I had no
financial interest in the project? As far as I know, under American
law, ordinary citizens voting in a civic election, as opposed to
those elected or appointed as representatives of others and voting in
that capacity, have no such obligation, and the law only forbids the
direct purchase of votes.


Halachic Headline image

Chasam
Sofer additionally rules that if we establish through witnesses that
a particular candidate had himself ordered the purchase of
votes, he is thereby ineligible for any Rabbinic position
until he repents.

Rav
Shlomoh Yehudah Tabak has another important responsum on this topic
(Resp. Teshuras Shai II:56). The seven Tuvei Ha’ir of some community
had reached a unanimous decision on a certain financial question
within their purview, but one of them had been paid to vote the way
he did, and the question therefore arose as to whether their decision
was binding. Rav Tabak takes for granted that the vote of the
compromised official does not count, and the thrust of his argument
is to show that the entire vote is invalid even though the
decision had been unanimous and the other six officials had not been
tampered with.

He reasons that Halachah requires the presence and participation of
all members of a deliberative body even where the decision of a
majority suffices. In our case, the purchased member must be
considered as absent, and the vote is therefore invalid. Moreover, a
corrupted member is actually even worse than an absent one, since the
undue influence of the bribe may have spread to his colleagues
through his persuading them of his position (see the actual responsum
for the background and details of his arguments).


 
Piskei Halacha

The Halachos of Baal Talin Part III

 
I. Although the value of less than a pruta (roughly five cents) is normally considered by the Torah to carry no halachic significance, some Rishonim maintain that an employer violates Baal Talin even if he only withholds wages amounting to less than a pruta.[1]

II. An employer even violates Baal Talin if he withholds the wages of a minor. A minor is considered to be a full-fledged worker even if the work that is being performed or the wage that is being offered is nominal. For example, an adult that promises a child and ice cream cone if he rakes the leaves is subject to the laws of Baal Talin.[2] However, it is likely that this does not apply when the hired child is also the adults dependent, as in the case when a parent hires his child.[3]

III. An employer that withholds the wages of a child violates Baal Talin even if the child does not ask for them.[4] However, if one hired a young girl to be a babysitter and she knew that the employer would only return late at night after she had already returned to her home, delaying payment until the morning does not constitute a violation of Baal Talin. [5] If the employer delays and does not pay immediately in the morning he violates the Rabbinic prohibition of Baal Tishaheh as he would with an adult worker.


IV. If the employer only has part of the wages, he must pay that which he has. In this way he has fulfilled the positive command of paying his employees on time to the extent that he is able to. [6] If the employer delivers only partial payment despite having the money to pay in full, he violates the prohibition of Baal Talin on the portion which he did not pay. [7]


V. Upon hiring a worker, the employer is immediately obligated to fulfill the positive commandment of B’yomo Titen Secharo. [8] He may delay fulfilling this obligation until the end of the day. However, since he is already obligated in the Mitzvah, he may not voluntarily deplete his funds during the day and put himself into a situation in which he will not be able to pay his worker by the end of the day.


VI. An employer should pay immediately after the work is completed as an expression of the concept of zerizim makdimin l’mitzvos- one should be quick to do a mitzvah. [9] It is also preferable to pay in person rather than through an agent. [10]

VII. One may pay a worker before davening Shacharis. [11] The Arizal was careful to pay his employees before Mincha even though this forced him to daven later and even though it meant that he would have to rush his davening [12].

VIII. If one’s worker finished a job on Erev Shabbos, one is required to pay on time even if doing so will mean that he will not have enough money to fulfill his own mitzvah of Oneg Shabbos. [13]

IX. An employer is required to pay on time even if by doing so he will not have the money to pay for a mitzvah d’oraysa. [14]

X. An employer must pay his workers when they come to ask for their wages even if the employer would not be violating the prohibition of Baal Talin by withholding them, (e.g. if the worker was hired through a third party.) The request of a worker for payment of his wages even takes precedence over a request made at the same time by a poor person for tzedaka.[15]



1 Meiri and Chiddushim Hameyuchasim L’haRitva on Baba Metzia,111b
2 Shu’t Rashba 3:99, Ahavas Chesed 9:5, Shulchan Aruch 270:2 and Remah 270:1.
3 The wages earned by a dependant belong to the person who provides the dependant’s livelihood. Therefore, when a parent obligates himself to pay wages to his child he does not technically owe the child the wages since the child would, in turn, owe them back to his parent. So to speak, the parent would ‘owe himself’ the promised reward. See Berur Halacha, part 6, who discusses this concept.
4 This is primarily because a child is likely to be embarrassed to ask. In addition, an employer does not violate Baal Talin if the employee does not ask for his wages because the employee, in essence, has been mochel, (has forgiven) the employer of this obligation. However, since the forgiveness of a child is not halachically valid, the employer remains obligated to pay the child’s wages on time.
5 In this case it is considered as if there was an initial agreement to receive the wages in the morning because she was aware of the obvious fact that she would be sleeping by the time the employer returned.
6 Ahavas Chesed 9:10; The reasoning being that his obligation only encompasses that which is in his possession.
7 See Ahavas Chesed ibid.
8 Ahavas Chesed 9:9 and Nesiv Hachesed 9:25
9 This ruling is based on the Chofetz Chaim’s opinion that the positive commandment of B’yomo Titen Secharo takes effect immediately. If so, just as with any other mitzvah one should complete it punctiliously.
10 The Tov Yerushalayim notes that the Aderes was very meticulous to pay his workers in person. However, if the employer does not intend to bring the money to the employee, it is not appropriate that the employer trouble the employee to travel to him in order to enable the employer to pay in person. Therefore, if one does not plan on going to his employee to deliver the money, one should send it through an agent.
11 Paying an employee on time is no less than any other action in the category of cheftzei shamayim which is permitted before davening Shacharis.
12 Rav Chaim Vital records this about the Arizal in Shaar Hamitzvos, Parshas Ki Tetzei. He quotes the Arizal as saying, “How could I daven if I have not fulfilled this great mitzvah?”
13 Beur Halacha 242, s.v. “l’chabed”
14 Beur Halacha, ibid, writes the mitzvah of paying a worker on time is more important than Oneg Shabbos, even according to those that consider Oneg Shabbos to be a Torah requirement. This is because paying a worker on time involves numerous mitzvos (B’yomo Titein S’charo, Baal Talin).
15 This is the Ben Ish Chai ‘s ruling in Teshuvos Rav Poalim, part 4, Choshen Mishpat , Siman 7.


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