However, a medrash on this week’s Parsha, quoted by Rashi
(Breishis 42,14), provides us with a very specific connection to our
topic. The medrash explains that during their first meeting with the
Egyptian viceroy, the brothers mentioned that they have a brother who
was taken into captivity and that they were looking for him. The
viceroy asked them whether they would be willing to pay an exorbitant
amount for him if that was necessary to free him. They replied that
they would be willing to do that.
 
While
the brothers’ willingness to free their captive brother at all costs is
certainly admirable, it seems to be at odds with the Talmud’s view of
things. The Mishnah in Gittin 45a states,
“A captive is not redeemed for more than his worth (on the slave
market) because that is best for the world.” This statement of the
Mishnah is codified in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, 252:4.
 
A
simple reading of the Mishnah would indicate that one should not do
whatever it takes to free a captive, yet Yosef’s brothers were prepared
to do just that. While the brothers’ apparent non-conformity to the
halacha may be puzzling, this halacha, in and of itself, leaves us even
more bewildered. Why should one not extend himself to free a captive?
And why is not doing so “best for the world” as the Mishnah states?
Obviously, further investigation into this halacha is in order.
 
The
Talmud offers two possible ways to understand the Mishna. Firstly, it
is well-known that the Jewish community will not abandon one of its own
no matter how high the cost. However, there is a great danger that a
policy of requiring the redeeming of prisoners for “whatever it takes”
would drain the financial resources of the Jewish community whose
responsibility it is to redeem the captive. That would not be “best for
the world.” Therefore, in spite of the emotional push to free him at
all costs, the Torah puts a ceiling on the price that a community is
required to pay. In other words, the halacha
stated in the Mishnah is a minimum requirement that must be fulfilled
by a Jewish community in its effort to free one of its members. Of
course, a community (or any individual from the community) would
certainly be allowed to go beyond that minimum requirement if it so
chooses. According to this reason, Yosef’s brothers were certainly
allowed to redeem Yosef for as much as they wished. 
 
In
contrast, the second reason given by the Talmud views the statement of
the Mishnah as a prohibition against redeeming a captive for more than
the market price. The reasoning behind this prohibition is that paying
outrageous sums to free captives encourages the enemy to repeat the
crime and take more captives. This cycle of kidnapping, paying huge
ransoms, and further kidnapping, is an intolerable situation. By
refusing to succumb to the enemy’s blackmail, the cycle stops.
According
to this reason, neither a community nor an individual would be allowed
to ransom a captive for more than what the captor would have been able
to get had he kidnapped a non-Jew. Although
such a policy might be very harmful to an individual member of society
in the eventuality of being taken hostage, it provides a great benefit
to society-at-large.
 
With regard to Yosef’s brothers, we now
can understand why their position was within the guidelines of halacha.
Who comprised the Jewish community at
the time that Yosef was held in captivity?
Obviously, the Jewish
community only consisted of Yosef’s brothers. Since all the brothers
had agreed to pay an exorbitant ransom for Yosef, they had also
accepted upon themselves the risk of future kidnappings that paying
such a ransom involves.
 
The halacha sets up fair-market-value redemption as the
de facto policy for Jewish society. It does not forbid a society from
unanimously accepting upon itself to forego the benefits of that policy
if it wishes to do so in order in order to free an individual captive.
However, when
the Jewish community is wide-spread and diverse, unanimous agreement to
waive this policy for the sake of one specific individual is not a
realistic possibility. Noteworthy
is the fact that the halacha requires the redemption of a Torah scholar
even if it entails paying more than the market price, and thereby,
demands that all members of Jewish society accept the risks and burdens
involved in the waiving of this policy.
 
Let
us understand the enormous moral implications that are implied by what
we have just learned. What
if wealthy family members are willing to subsidize the entire cost of
the redemption of their close relative? In this instance, no burden
would be placed on the financial resources of the community. Therefore,
the first reason for the prohibition, to preserve the economic
stability of the Jewish community, would not apply. However, the second
reason to forbid paying astronomical sums to ransom Jewish prisoners
still applies. Regardless of who pays the high price tag, whether it
be the community-at-large or the captive’s relatives, the enemy will be
highly motivated to kidnap again. Based on this concern, the Rambam
(Matanos Anei’im 8:12) and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 252:4-5) prohibit
even family members to pay exorbitant sums to free their relative.
 
This
is an amazing idea. It is possible that the family members are
multi-millionairesand are easily able to redeem their loved-one.
Nevertheless, if they give in to the enemy’s extortionist demands, they
will damage and endanger the entire Jewish people. In spite of the great sacrifice involved, the family must exercise restraint for the
sake of the nation. In short, a Jew must be concerned about the ripple
effect he has on society.
 
We find this principle of individual
restraint for the good of society as a whole in other areas of Jewish
law as well. When the gentiles were inflating the price of fish, the
Rabbis decreed a mandatory boycott on the
purchase of fish for Shabbos in an attempt to force them to lower their
prices (Mishnah Brurah 242). The more affluent members of society
likely complained, “How can we honor the Shabbos without fish?!? We can
afford it!” Still, they were told to temporarily refrain from buying
fish so that in the long run everyone in the community would be able to
honor the Shabbos with fish on their table.
 
Generally speaking,
in modern society boycotts do not work. People do not heed them. Yet,
the Sages expected the Jewish community to be able to successfully
carry out a boycott. They relied on the fact that a Jew will be
concerned about the ripple effect he has on his society.
 

The restrictions that Orthodox Jewish communities have recently
accepted upon themselves with regard to costly weddings also illustrate
this point.  A wedding is not a private affair. It involves the
community. While most members of a community generally plan a simcha
according to the financial standards of that community, prosperous
individuals may be tempted to plan more lavish affairs. However, this
slowly and subtly raises the standard for the rest of the community,
and puts pressure on the others to “keep up.” There is a ripple effect.
In order to establish and protect a reasonable standard for the Jewish
community as a whole, the leaders of today’s Torah communities have
made great efforts to institute
wedding-arrangement restrictions and guidelines. By and large, people
are sticking to them. Certainly, these efforts are “best for the
world.”     
 
Finally, let us look at the present housing
crisis in Israel caused by a freeze in the building of new homes. This
freeze has caused an inevitable rise in demand for existing real
estate, especially in Jerusalem. Consequently, prices have
sky-rocketed.
Many landlords have seized the opportunity to raise the rent on a
yearly basis. Numerous unfortunate tenants, unable to afford the price
hikes, change apartments every twelve months.
 
In response to this untenable situation, several communities have initiated local boards to assess and maintain
fair prices for apartment rentals. They have received rabbinical
approval and support. However, these attempts to maintain fair rental
prices often fail, but not because of the landlords. They cannot raise
the rents if no one will pay their prices. The rent control efforts
break down when a renter says, “I need this apartment, and I can afford
it.” True, he can afford to pay the higher rent, but the cost of
rentals will slowly rise in the neighborhood and other renters will
suffer. Once again, a ripple effect takes place, and it is up to each
individual to be aware of the contribution that he might be making to
the overall problem.
 
Only a truly great halachic authority could be called upon to actually rule in a case such as Gilad Shalit’s. This article
has touched upon only some of the halachic considerations that are
relevant in determining what should or should not be done to obtain his
freedom. (And of course, we all hope and pray that Gilad will be freed
soon.) However, we have learned more than simply the halacha. We have
uncovered a moral imperative. The Torah expects from us something which
we might mistakenly think to be beyond us. It expects that we forego
our best interests when those interests cause a detrimental ripple
effect on our society. Now, that is something that only the Torah can
demand. In light of man’s selfish nature, no one else would imagine we
could do it. Sometimes we need the Torah to tell us just how good we
can really be